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1 In 1966 two sociologists, Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, published a small yet
influential book, titled The Social Construction of Reality, in which they argue that reality is
socially constructed and that it is the task of the sociology of knowledge to analyze the
process  in  which  this  occurs  (1966:  1).  They  acknowledge  in  their  Introduction  that
“reality” and “knowledge” are two terms with a long philosophical history, and they are
careful to claim they are not using the terms in a philosophical way, but rather within the
context of sociology. Berger and Luckmann describe the task of the philosopher as one of
trying to differentiate between valid and invalid assertions about the world, in a general
sense, whereas sociology of knowledge is concerned with reality and knowledge within
the context of various social settings. The sociologist must keep quotation marks around
the terms reality and knowledge.
2 Berger  and  Luckmann  (1966)  assume  epistemology  is  a  study  of  knowledge  without
quotation marks,  Knowledge that  is  really  true,  whereas  the  sociology of  knowledge
studies common people’s claims to “knowledge” that are assumed beliefs, maybe even
justified  beliefs,  but  not  necessarily  true.  Epistemologists  establish  the  criteria  and
standards  necessary  to  prove  validity  and  truth.  As  epistemology  traditionally  has
defined knowledge, only what we believe is true, have good reason to believe is true, and
in fact is true, can we call knowledge. Knowledge = Truth. Because knowledge is defined
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as what is justified true belief, then it is necessary for sociologists to qualify their studies
because they are not claiming that what common people believe is “true” is really true.
They are not claiming that what people believe is “real” really is. Their task is to study
how beliefs come to be viewed as real and true. Philosophers, according to the tradition
which Berger and Luckmann reflect rather than question, have the task of proving the
validity of truth claims, of making the case for warranted assertions that are justified as
necessarily so.
3 I question that it is possible to accomplish what transcendental epistemologists claim to
be able to do. I want to suggest that we can never remove the quotation marks from
around knowledge and reality.  I  join others in arguing that none of  us have access to
transcendence, none of us can know what is True or Real, in a universal sense, and so we
must all be content to continue to talk about “knowledge” and “reality” as Berger and
Luckmann do, with quotation marks around the terms. Like Berger and Luckmann, I want
the reader to know up front that I symbolically place quotation marks around the concept
“epistemology” to distinguish it  from the philosophical  definition of  epistemology as
transcendental, even though I will not literally place “ ” around the term each time I use
it, for ease of reading. I will follow Richard Rorty’s (1979) lead and capitalize Epistemology
when  I  use  the  term  in  the  traditional  philosophical  sense,  with  an  assumption  of
absolutism. However, I am not just striving to use the term ‘epistemology’ in a traditional
sociological way here either. I want to redefine epistemology. I want to reconstruct the
meaning  of  the  term.  I  will  adopt  a  methodological  tool  often  used  in  postmodern
discourse and place parenthesis’s around the e of epistemology, like so, (e)pistemology, to
further remind the reader when I am using the term epistemology in a non-transcendent
way, meaning within the context of this world, not removed from our ordinary, everyday
experiences.
4 Like Dewey, I argue that “the most pervasive fallacy of philosophic thinking goes back to
neglect of context, to philosophy’s effort to describe itself in a transcendental manner,
removed from the context of the everyday, common world” (Dewey, 1960: 92). I question
philosophy’s assumed ability to tell us what is a priori Truth and Goodness and Beauty, as
well as science’s assumed ability to avoid philosophical questions. I join feminists and
postmodernists  in  reasserting  the  need  to  uncover  the  philosopher’s  assumption  of
power. Along with other pragmatists, I agree that the philosopher’s role should be one of
cultural critic, and helping to develop ideas to deal with the actual crises of our lives.
Philosophers can help to guide historical change intelligently because not only do they
legitimate conformities, they also question conformities that have become so habitual
that they are taken to be Reality or Truth. I do not intend to offer an extensive argument
for the demise of Epistemology in this essay, Richard Rorty (1979) has already done that
very well, as did John Dewey (1938) before him, with his Logic. There are many others who
have  contributed  to  the  death  of  transcendental  Philosophy,  and  Epistemology  in
particular, as well.
5 My  task  is  to  describe  a  non-transcendent  (e)pistemology.  My  voice  is  one  that  is
attempting to contribute to the demise of traditional Epistemology, while at the same
time  reclaiming  traditional  Epistemological  concerns  of  standards  and  criteria  for
warranting arguments and determining truths from falsities.  These concerns must be
reclaimed in order to make them visible and hold them accountable as well as make them
pragmatically  useful,  but  on  socially  constructed  grounds,  not  on  transcendental
grounds. We must confront Epistemology, and deconstruct it, so that we can dissolve the
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dualisms it creates and move on. These dualisms include for example: absolute/relative,
subjective/objective, mind/body, knower/known.
6 What  I  offer  here  is  one  pragmatist  social  feminist  view,  a  relational  perspective  of
knowing. I seek to offer an epistemological theory that insists that knowers/subjects are
fallible, that our criteria are corrigible, and that our standards are socially constructed,
and thus continually in need of critique and reconstruction. I offer a self-conscious and
reflective epistemological theory, one that attempts to be adjustable and adaptable as
people gain further in their understanding. This epistemology must be inclusive and open
to others, because of its assumption of fallible knowers. And, this epistemology must be
capable of being corrected because of its assumption that our criteria and standards are
of this world, one’s we, as fallible knowers socially construct.
7 ‘Relations’ form the heart of this (e)pistemological theory and are a unique contribution I
have  to  offer,  in  terms  of  drawing  our  attention  to  relational  forms  of  knowing  as
opposed to individual descriptions, which have dominated Euro-western Epistemological
theories  for  so  long.  I  certainly  do  not  want  to  claim to  have  discovered  relational
approaches to knowledge. In fact, to make such a claim contradicts my own theory. I
argue  that  we  become  knowers  and  are  able  to  contribute  to  the  constructing  of
knowledge due to the relationships we have with others. None of us are able to make
contributions without the help of others, and none of us discover new ideas all on our
own. I describe a theory of knowing that aims to show how interconnected we all are, not
just to each other personally, but also to our social environments, our cultures, past,
present, and future, as well as our surrounding natural environment, and the forces of
the universe as a whole. I also describe how much our individual, unique ideas are caught
up within webs of related ideas.
8 My relational epistemology calls for active engagement, aims at democratic inclusion,
joins theory with praxis, strives for awareness of context and values, while tolerating
vagueness and ambiguities. I argue that knowing is something people develop as they
have experiences with each other and the world around them. People improve upon the
ideas that have been socially constructed and passed down to them by others. They do
this  improving  by  further  developing  their  understandings  and  enlarging  their
perspectives. With enlarged perspectives people are able to create new meanings for their
experiences. In summation: My relational epistemology views knowing as something that is
socially constructed by embedded, embodied people who are in relation with each other.
9 My plan is to present the feminist and pragmatist sides of this debate sequentially in
sections  one  and  two,1 turning  to  Lorraine  Code’s  concern  for  a  “responsibilist”
epistemology and Sandra Hardings’  feminist  standpoint  as  well  as  Charlene Haddock
Seigfried’s call for feminists to give up the epistemological project from the feminist side
of the debate. John Dewey’s work will take center stage in the discussion of pragmatism’s
side of the debate. I will end this discussion by co-opting (e)pistemology and removing its
absolute status, even in its non-vulgar form, in exchange for a qualified relativist status. I
will reclaim the value and importance of being able to make judgments and present our
arguments based on criteria that are socially constructed and therefore open to criticism
and improvement. I will keep in check (e)pistemology’s will to transcendental power and
its  desire  to  embrace  dualisms  such  as  knower/known,  mind/body,  theory/practice,
subject/object.  Thus,  the  reader  should  end these  sections  with a  good sense  of  my
position within the epistemological debate, as well as a better understanding of why I
continue to use the word epistemology, though in its altered form of (e)pistemology.
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II. Some Feminist Concerns
10 Philosophy means the love of wisdom. It involves inquiry into “the nature of things”
based on logical reasoning rather than empirical methods, which are science’s realm.
Philosophers analyze and critique “fundamental beliefs,” and they investigate causes and
laws “underlying reality.” Here, we find that we must capitalize Philosophy right from its
beginning because the assumption of universality is built right into its definition. Inquiry
into the nature of things, into fundamental beliefs, and underlying reality, is inquiry in a
universal, general way, divorced from its particularity.
11 In  Feminist  Epistemologies,  Linda  Alcoff  and  Elizabeth  Potter  (1993)  note  in  their
introductory essay that feminists began contributing to Philosophy from the margins,
and they have moved to the center.  The margins are the applied fields,  in particular
applied ethics, which is where feminist work was first published. “Feminist philosophers
began work in the applied areas because feminism is, first and last, a political movement
concerned with practical issues, and feminist philosophers understood their intellectual
work to be a contribution to the public debate on crucial practical issues” (such as the
right to equal job opportunities,  and to own property) (Alcoff  & Potter 1993:  2).  The
center, or what Alcoff and Potter call “the ‘core’ areas” of Philosophy are Epistemology
and Metaphysics.
12 Alcoff and Potter (1993) inform us that when feminists began working in the field of
Epistemology,  their  contribution  was  as  critique  of  the  tradition,  as  was  their
contribution in the other philosophical fields of study. If Epistemology is defined as a
theory of knowledge in general,  then a feminist epistemology that refers to women’s
experiences, is an oxymoron, due to its efforts to focus on the particularity of women
instead  of  the  generality  of  human  beings.  And,  indeed,  when  feminists  began
contributing to Epistemology they were criticized for not doing Epistemology, as it has
been historically  defined.  Feminists  found that  they can only  begin to  contribute  to
Epistemology by first challenging the Philosophical premise “that a general account of
knowledge, one that uncovers justificatory standards a priori, is possible” (Alcoff & Potter
1993: 1; emphasis in original). Feminists argue that while ‘human beings’ is a concept that
claims to include “all people,” it really has historically been an androcentric concept that
represents a male perspective. Since traditional Epistemology has not been able to present
a generality but rather has represented a male perspective as if it is general, neutral, and
inclusive of women, then there is the possibility of offering a feminist epistemology. This
is  why critique of  the tradition has  to  come first,  in  order  to  create  a  space where
feminists  can  begin  to  actually  do  constructive  and  reconstructive  work  in
(e)pistemology.  Many feminists  have  contributed to  the  argument  that  girl/woman  is
excluded from the concept “human beings” (“mankind”) and treated as “other” in Euro-
western philosophy.2 Once establishing that the female voice has been excluded from
Philosophy in general, which I think most philosophers would agree has been successfully
accomplished, the next step is to establish the exclusion of the female voice within the
field of Epistemology.
13 A significant example of androcentrism in Philosophy is demonstrated by the association
of Philosophy with the mind, which is linked to males, in contrast to the body, which is
connected to females. Although Descartes usually gets blamed for splitting the mind from
the body in Euro-western philosophy (Bordo 1987; Rorty 1979), I argue that we can go
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back to ancient Greece and find many examples of Plato severing the mind from the body,
and assigning the body to a lesser status (Thayer-Bacon 2000). A most vivid example of
Plato’s separation and assigned value can be found in his theory of knowledge. Plato
describes each of us as having an immortal soul that knows all, and we forget what we
know when our souls inhabit our bodies at birth. Thus, our bodies cause us to forget all
knowledge, and we are doomed to spending our lifetimes trying to remember what we
already knew.
14 Once the body is split from the mind, and given a lesser status as that which serves as a
barrier, deceives us, and lures us away from seeking Truth due to its earthly passions,
then it  is  an easy next  step to associate women with the body.  Simone de Beauvoir
(1952/89) carefully makes the argument that there are only two things that distinguish
women from men when we look at cultures around the world and through-out time, and
yet these two things have been used to assign women an inferior, Other, status in many
cultures. Given the inferior status of the body, it is not surprising to find that these two
things that distinguish women from men have to do with women’s physical bodies, that
they have weaker muscles and they menstruate. de Beauvoir points toward the future
when  technology  will  help  women  compensate  for  their  weaker  muscles,  and  birth
control will bring their reproductive systems within their control. When that day comes,
de Beauvoir predicted that women may finally be given an equal status. That day that de
Beauvoir predicted is here for many women, still women have not yet reached an equal
status. Neutralizing bodily differences is not enough to change women’s status; the status
of the body must be raised and it must be reconnected to the mind. Feminists realize now
that in order to help put an end to the androcentrism in Philosophy, we must call into
question the body/mind split, and make the case for a wholistic bodymind. That argument
comes from many diverse camps, and is presented in my (2003) larger text in chapters on
personal relations, w/holistic relations, ecological relations, and scientific relations.
15 Traditional Epistemology shows its androcentricism with its embrace of Rationality as an
Ideal, for rationality (or reason) is again associated with the mind, which is linked to
males. Irrationality, in contrast, is associated with the emotions and intuitions, which are
normally attributed to women. So, historically within the field of Epistemology, males
function as the model for rationality and females serve as the model for irrationality.
Feminists  have  argued for  the  value  of  intuition  and emotions  (and imagination)  in
reason, by turning to women’s experiences and describing women’s ways of knowing
(Belenky et al.  1986; Gilligan 1982; Martin 1994; Ruddick 1989).  Along with traditional
androcentric  Epistemological  models,  we now have examples  of  gynocentric  (female)
Epistemological models (Duran 1991). However, claiming a distinctive status for women
as knowers not only serves to raise their status, it also continues to maintain a gender
split.  As long as a gender split  is  maintained,  women still  serve in the role of  Other
defined in contrast to rational males. Once again, feminists have learned that the best
way to gain women’s status as rational beings who are potential knowers is to call into
question the rational/irrational (mind/body) split, and to show that all of us use many
tools to help us construct knowledge, our reason, emotions, intuition, and imagination,
for example (Thayer-Bacon 2000).
16 Another good place to look for androcentrism in Epistemology is with the “subject,” ‘S’ in
“S knows that p” statements. The subject, the knower, the epistemic agent, are all quite
objective, neutral terms that could represent anyone, so it seems. In fact, not only is the
knower represented with neutral terminology, the importance and weight of considering
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‘S’s’ contribution to ‘that p’ is minimalized, thus devaluing the importance of ‘S’ even
more. Historically, Epistemology has been based on an assumption that subjects (S) do not
need  to  be  taken  into  consideration  in  determining  ‘that  p.’  As  Epistemology  has
historically developed, the subject, S, has been severed from ‘that p’ and the attention of
epistemologists  has  been  focused  on  ‘that  p,’  at  the  expense  of  ‘S.’  Euro-western
Philosophy concerns itself with the product of knowers’ efforts. Knowers are separated
from what is known, and devalued in importance.
17 Lorraine  Code  (1987)  argues  that  not  taking  subjects  into  account  leads  us  to  the
following traditional Epistemological conclusions:
(1)  that  knowledge  properly  so-called  is  autonomous  in  that  it  is  of  no
epistemological significance whose it is; (2) that knowledge acquisition may be of
psychological interest but it is irrelevant to an epistemologist’s quest for criteria of
justification, validity, and verification; and (3) that knowledge is objective in the
sense that discussion of the character and epistemic circumstances of subjects has
nothing to contribute to the proper epistemological task of assessing the product.
(Code 1987: 25-6)
18 If we can ignore knowers in our quest for knowledge, then we can ignore questions such
as how do we come to be knowledgable, and for what purpose is such knowledge? We can
ignore questions that draw our attention to the context of knowing, show the connection
of knowledge with values, and point to issues of power. We can ignore gender, class,
ethnicity, and race as categories of concern, for example. If we diminish the importance
of subjects, then we can pretend to offer a neutral, general theory of knowledge, when
what we really offer is an androcentric Epistemology. The androcentrism is visible in the
objectification and neutralization of the subject.
19 Lorraine Code’s work has contributed to a feminist effort to bring the subject, ‘S,’ more
directly into discussions of epistemology. In Epistemic Responsibility her (1987) focus is on
making the case that there are moral implications to knowledge claims, and that we need
to understand how directly connected morality is to epistemology. Code’s central claim is
“that knowing well is as much a moral as it is an epistemological matter” (Code 1987:
252).  The  way  we  understand  that  knowing  well  is  a  matter  of  considerable  moral
significance is to pay attention to the character of would-be knowers. Code tells us she is
trying to shift the emphasis of investigation and evaluation so that knowers come to bear
as much of the onus of credibility as “the known” (Code 1987: 8-9). She wants to put
“epistemic responsibility” in a central place in theories of knowledge.3 She wants to insist
that knowers must be held accountable to their community as well as to the evidence.
20 In “Taking Subjectivity into Account,” Code (1993) again takes up the topic of looking at
‘S’ of  ‘S  knows  that  p’  statements.  Here  she  makes  the  case  these  statements  are
representative of a “received” knowledge model that is very narrow and limited in scoop.
By “received” knowledge, she means “conditions that hold for any knower, regardless of
her or his identity, interests, and circumstances (i.e., her or his subjectivity)” (Code 1993:
15). This dominant Enlightenment Epistemological theory, see for example Harvey Siegel
(1987,  1997),  relies  on  Ideals  of  objectivity  and  value  neutrality  (Siegel’s  non-vulgar
absolute),  to argue that Reason allows ‘S’  to transcend particularity and contingency.
Thus ‘S’ is suppose to represent anyone and everyone (no one in particular). Code wants
to seriously entertain a model of “constructed” knowledge, that “requires epistemologists
to  pay  as  much attention to  the  nature  and situation –  the  location –  of  S  as  they
commonly pay to the content of p; […] [she maintains] that a constructivist reorientation
requires  epistemologists  to  take  subjective  factors  –  factors  that  pertain  to  the
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circumstances of the subject, S – centrally into account in evaluative and justificatory
procedures” (Code 1993: 20).4 Thus, gender, race, class, ethinicity become recognized as
primary analytic categories as we move to take subjectivity into account.
21 Code (1993) makes the case that subjectivity is always there, hidden, despite disclai- mers,
and that we can always find the context that is being suppressed. Subjectivity is found in
the examples selected for discussion,  and the experiences used to represent “human
thought,” for example. Contra to traditional Epistemologists, Code argues that “taking
subjectivity into account does not entail abandoning objectivity” (Code 1993: 36; emphasis
in original). What it does is help us guard against reductivism and rigidity. It allows us to
accommodate change, by letting knowledge claims be provisional and approximate. Code
describes  herself  as  a  “mitigated  relativist,”  who  argues  that  epistemology  has  no
ultimate foundation, “but neither does it float free, because it is grounded in experiences
and practices, in the efficacy of dialogic negotiation and of action” (Code 1993: 39). This is
similar to my qualified relativist position which I (2002, 2003) further develop in Relational
“(e)pistemologies,” Chapter Two.
22 What we have found out so far in this section is that feminists have successfully made the
case for Philosophy’s androcentrism, as well as Epistemology’s androcentrism. Feminists
have  argued  soundly  for  the  dissolving  of  the  body/mind  dualism  and  for  taking
subjectivity into account as they make the case for viewing knowledge in relation to
knowers. Current male philosophers, such as Siegel (1987, 1997) are careful not to claim a
spectator’s view of knowledge, and are willing to acknowledge their own embeddedness.
Yet they do not want to relinquish the claim to epistemic privilege that they have held for
so long, for fear they will be left with nothing (relativism). In their efforts to hold back
subjectivity and contextuality so that they admit some, but not so much that all is lost,
some traditional Epistemologists such as Siegel have found allies amongst feminists, in
particular  spontaneous  empiricist  feminists  and  standpoint  feminists,  as  labeled  by
Sandra Harding (1991, 1993). Like her, these feminists tend to work in various fields of
science.
23 According to Harding (1993), spontaneous empiricist feminists, such as Lynn Hankinson
Nelson, Elizabeth Potter, and Helen Longino, argue that insufficient care and rigor in
following the existing methods and norms is what has caused sexist and androcentric
results in research. They do not think the problem lies in the basic canons, but rather
with how we do science and philosophy. They recommend that what we need is more
precision and clarity, what we need is to do good science and philosophy that is more
careful  and  rigorous.  Like  Siegel  (1987,  1997)  in  regards  to  Philosophy,  empiricist
feminists accept the inescapablity of social influence on the content of science. Longino’s
(1990, 1993) work helps us understand the deep hostility science and philosophy have
historically expressed toward women.  Elizabeth Potter (1993) and Lynn Nelson (1990,
1993)  shed  light  on  the  negotiating  process  that  goes  on  in  science,  within
epistemological communities.
24 Nelson,  Potter,  and Longino each argue for  a  community’s  approach for  establishing
warrantability,  as  a  way  to  undermine  Epistemology’s  traditional  transcendental
perspective, as well as to avoid not being able to offer critique at all. Rather than thinking
individuals are epistemic agents, that ‘S’ is a single knower, they recommend we think of
communities as the primary epistemic agencies. Code (1987, 1993) recommends this as
well.  This strategy to combat science and philosophy’s hostility,  Longino describes as
“multiplying the subjects,” or as “views from many wheres” (Longino 1993: 113; emphasis
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in original). If we treat science (and philosophy) as a practice, that commits us to viewing
inquiry  as  ongoing and theories  as  partial,  then “we can recognize  pluralism in the
community  as  one  of  the  conditions  for  the  continued  development  of  scientific
knowledge  in  this  sense”  (Longino 1993:  116).  Longino concludes  no  segment  of  the
community can claim epistemic privilege. She recommends the creation of what she calls
a “cognitive democracy,” of “democratic science,” using public and common standards
(Longino 1993: 118).
25 Harding, however, thinks “the methods and norms in the disciplines are too weak to
permit researchers systematically to identify and eliminate from the results of research
those  social  values,  interests,  and  agendas  that  are  shared  by  the  entire  scientific
community or virtually all of it” (Harding 1993: 52, emphasis in original). The scientific
method cannot rid itself of bias. Thus she recommends her strong objectivity method,
which places the subjects of knowledge on the same critical, causal plane as objects of
knowledge. Harding’s “strong objectivity” requires that scientists (and philosophers) and
their communities (Subjects) be critiqued as well as ‘that p’ (Harding 1993: 69).
All of the kinds of objectivity-maximizing procedures focused on the nature and/or
social relations that are the object result of observation and reflection must also be
focused on the observers and reflectors – scientists and the larger society whose
assumptions they share. But a maximally critical study of scientists [philosophers]
and their communities can be done only from the perspective of those whose lives
have been marginalized by such communities. (Harding, 1993: 69)
26 Harding’s strong objectivity method is based on a feminist standpoint epistemological
theory.  Harding and others,5 have made important points about who gets left  out of
communities of  inquirers.  They  argue  for  the  need  to  expand  epistemological
communities to include those on the margins, those outsiders who are not traditionally
viewed as experts, such as women, people of color, and people lacking in property. Using
Marx,  Engels,  and  Lukacs  (and  Hegel)  as  their  sources  initially,  feminist  standpoint
theorists seek to understand the relations between power and knowledge, by looking at
collective  subjects,  groups  with  shared  histories  and  shared  locations  in  relation  to
power. They try to generate different accounts from the dominant ones and explore the
intersections of different outsider perspectives (e.g. feminists of color, gay and lesbian
accounts, etc.). They do not claim to have a traditional Epistemological goal of seeking
Truth, rather their project is to understand power relations, in order to be able to change
them, by privileging the speech of marginalized subjects. Their Subject focus is also not of
individuals,  but collective subjects,  groups who share histories,  experiences,  based on
their shared positionality in relations of power.
27 Feminist  standpoint  epistemologists  adopt  the  traditional  Epistemologist’s  claim  to
epistemic privilege by claiming epistemic privilege for those traditionally excluded from
mainstream  philosophy.  According  to  Harding,  their  claim  is  “that  all  knowledge
attempts are socially situated and that some of these objective social locations are better
than others as starting points for knowledge projects [to] challenge some of the most
fundamental assumptions of the scientific [and Philosophical] world view […]” (Harding
1993:  56).  Looking  from  the  margins  helps  us  see  the  dominant  culture  and  its
assumptions of superiority. Marginalized lives provide us with the problems and agendas
for standpoint theories,  but not the solutions. Feminist standpoint theory starts from
women’s lives, but these women are embodied and visible, and they are multiple and
heterogenous, contradictary or incoherent. These marginal views are not just from our
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own marginalized lives,  as  women,  but  from other,  different,  and often oppositional
women’s lives as well (Harding 1993: 58).
28 Harding  describes  standpoint  epistemologists  as  “sociological  relativists”  –  but  not
epistemological relativists (Harding 1993: 61). Standpoint epistemologists want to have it
both ways, they accept “the idea of real knowledge that is socially situated” (Harding
1993: 50). While Harding does not want to claim she has a God’s eye view of what is Right/
True, she does want to claim the possibility of epistemic privilege, just with different
subjects. She shifts the claim of critical leverage from the center to the margin, from
philosophers  and  scientists,  to  those  excluded  from  philosophy  and  science’s
androcentric theories.  By doing so,  she continues to use an absolutist tool (epistemic
privilege) to try to dismantle absolutist Epistemology, in effect using a master’s tool to try
to dismantle the master’s house (Bar On 1993).6 Another absolutist tool Harding insists on
maintaining is “objectivity,” even though she is well aware of how objectivity has been
used in scientific projects that are now judged to be sexist, racist, classist, homophobic,
etc. Harding argues “(t)he notion of objectivity is useful in providing a way to think about
the gap that should exist between how any individual or group wants the world to be and
how in fact it is” (Harding 1993: 72). Thus we find she reveals her realist leanings. Longino
(1993)  describes  Harding’s  standpoint  theory  as  using  the  strategy  of  “changing  the
subject” to combat science and philosophy’s hostility to girls/women, and she suggests
Harding’s standpoint theory begs the question.
29 Harding (1993) tries to deny that her project is an epistemological one, arguing instead
that  she  is  looking  at  political  and  social  concerns.  However,  this  sharp  separation
between epistemology and social and political theory undermines her own claim that
“the grounds for knowledge are fully saturated with history and social life rather than
abstracted from it” (Harding 1993: 57). What Harding needs to deny is that her project is a
transcendental  Epistemological  one.  She,  and  other  feminists,  make  a  significant
contribution to the collapse of absolutist Epistemology by highlighting the relationship
between knowledge and power.  By showing transcendental  Epistemology’s biases and
limitations, Harding contributes to the description of a transformed (e)pistemology on
socially constructed grounds. If Harding’s theory is an accurate description of knowing,
then she cannot avoid using (e)pistemological theory in her own project. What she can do
is avoid transcendental Epistemology, and the use of its tools (such as epistemic privilege
and objectivity).
30 I agree with empiricist feminists and standpoint feminists that there is a need to embrace
pluralism,  and  in  fact  I  argue  elsewhere  that  (e)pistemological  fallibilism  entails
(e)pistemological pluralism, contra to Peirce and Siegel (Thayer-Bacon 2003: Chapter 2).
However, I do not think any of us, as knowers, can escape our own social embeddedness
completely, and therefore I do not think any one standpoint has the chance of offering us
a privileged, clearer, sounder view. There are as strong of limitations on women’s ways of
knowing, as on men’s, on Black’s as on White’s, on lower-classes’ as on middle or upper-
classes’,  on homosexual’s  as  on heterosexual’s  ways  of  knowing,  just to  name a  few
categories. The argument for standpoint epistemology risks sliding into determinism on
one end of the spectrum and reaffirming a spectator’s view on the other end. I argue that
where we fall is somewhere in-between. We are greatly determined by our social setting,
as social beings, but we are also able to become aware of our embeddedness, because we
are social beings. Others shape our views but others also help us become aware of how
views differ. I do not want to argue that any of us has a privileged perspective; I do not
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think any of us has a spectator’s view on Reality; we are always embedded within it. We
do not have views from nowhere,  and we are also never able to see the world from
everywhere. We are always situated and limited, our views are from somewhere. We are
able  to gain more critical  leverage the more we experience and expose ourselves  to
others’ standpoints, but we are never able to gain complete understanding. Contra to
Peirce (1958), I do not think the process of gaining understanding is linear, and the last
person on earth will know Truth, at the end of time. The last people on earth will still be
struggling with trying to understand from within their limited standpoints and they will
still need each other to help them inquire and develop greater insight.
31 Some feminists argue that feminists should give up the task of trying to write a feminist
epistemology, given the way Epistemology has historically been framed, in terms of its
assumptions of generic transcendence (Code, Seigfried). Others argue there is value in
developing a gynocentric epistemology in contrast  to the androcentric ones we have
inherited (Duran). I agree with Code and Seigfried, that it is impossible to write a feminist
epistemology given the constrictions of Epistemology as historically defined. A feminist
epistemology must include a gendered subject. Any attempt to include gender will be
judged by traditional Enlightenment epistemologists as over-reaching the boundaries of
Epistemology and asking Epistemology to stretch beyond its healthy limits.
32 Seigfried (1997) argues that there is a current hegemony of epistemology in philosophical
and theoretical discourse, and this hegemony is due to the model of rationality many
feminists are trying to challenge. Seigfried turns to pragmatism to help make the case
that  rationality  includes  “at  least  four  dimensions,  intellectual,  aesthetic,  moral,  and
practical,”  whereas  our  current  model  of  rationality  focuses  only  on the  intellectual
dimension (James  1909/77:  55).  Like  Dewey and James,  Seigfried  rejects  “the  myriad
dualisms  informing centuries  of  philosophic  speculation and the  spectator  theory  of
knowledge that emerged from them” (Seigfried 1997: 2). She describes the need to replace
“traditional  models  of  knowing  as  rationally  speculative  or  empirically  passive,  as
abstracting essences, satisfying a priori criteria, and producing certainty” with a model of
knowing as a way of doing (Seigfried 1997: 3). She warns that when feminists attempt to
“add back the other dimensions” to the intellectually focused rationality model they are
vulnerable to the charge of undermining the model itself. What feminists need to do is
transform the model of rationality, and thus the traditional models of Epistemology.
33 Following Dewey’s (1960) lead, Seigfried (1997) rejects what she calls “the very problem
which forms the core of epistemology,” that experience attaches to a private subject, and
develops independently of the world of facts, thus creating “the problem of how the mind
or subjective consciousness can understand the external world” (Seigfried 1997: 3). For
her, this separation of the knower from the world of facts (the known) is based on a false
metaphysics that separates experience from existence. This false assumption is the basis
for  the  spectator  view  of  knowers.  Seigfried  also  rejects  Epistemology’s  conceived
problem of knowledge in general. The Epistemological problem of knowledge in general is
derived from assuming that there is a knower in general, who is outside of the world to be
known.  Seigfried  warns  that  unless  this  assumption  is  undermined,  feminist
contributions to epistemology “will  never be taken as  anything other than at  best  a
distraction from and, at worst a distortion of, the epistemological enterprise” (Seigfried
1997: 4). She charges Epistemologists with continuing “to tinker at perfecting a perfectly
rational  account  of  knowledge  in  itself,  while  ignoring  the  question  of  what  such
knowledge is for, as well as how it arises in experience” (Seigfried 1997: 5).
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34 Seigfried  (1997)  encourages  feminists  to  reject  the  Epistemological  turn  that  has
dominated twentieth century philosophy departments, as pragmatists did earlier.  She
encourages  feminists  to  embrace  a  pragmatic  theory  of  knowledge  as  inquiry  that
satisfactorily resolves problematic situations.7 Seigfried recommends that:
(f)eminists do not have to defend themselves against hostile charges that they are
not doing rigorous philosophy, that is,  epistemology. They are not doing sloppy
epistemology, but have understood that theories of knowledge must continue to
develop into theories and practices of inquiry in order to get out of the cul-de-sac
in which epistemology has been stuck ever since it went into business for its own
sake. (Seigfried 1997: 14)
35 I  agree with feminist efforts to reject Epistemology,  given the standard philosophical
definition of Epistemology. However, I do not think feminists should be willing to accept
this traditional definition; we need to redefine “epistemology.” I recommend redefining
“epistemology” because I think traditional Epistemologists such as Siegel (1987, 1997) are
right, that it is not possible to hold a position seriously and yet deny the need to ground a
position with reasons that justify holding it.  It  is  impossible to avoid epistemological
concerns,  such  as  what  counts  as  criteria  and  standards  for  judging  and  critiquing
reasons used to justify arguments, without risking sliding into dogmatism. And, it is vital
that feminists actively engage in epistemological concerns in order to insist that criteria
and standards remain open to critique. Feminists need to actively participate in efforts to
continually improve upon the criteria and standards that our communities use. We need
to  confront  epistemological  concerns,  not  avoid  them because  of  the  transcendental
baggage attached to them. However, we can only confront absolutist Epistemology with
some tools of our own, such as an (e)pistemological theory offers.
36 The canons of Epistemology cannot stand up to the criticisms they are receiving from
feminists  (pragmatists  and  postmodernists).  The  current  absolutist  definition  of
Epistemology (even in Siegel’s (1987, 1997) non-vulgar form) has problems with it that
affect all philosophers, not just women, for all philosophers live in a gendered society.
Not  allowing  Epistemology  to  address  gender  issues  affects  men  and  women  alike.
Epistemology must be redefined so that Subjects are recognized as gendered subjects who
are also social beings living in-relation-with others. Epistemology must be redefined so
that it can be sensitive to actual outcomes, and require awareness of diverse contexts. A
redefined (e)pistemology must include: “the emotional dimensions of understanding, the
mutuality  of  facts  and values,  the  exploration and rejection of  pervasive  prejudices,
recognition of multiple standpoints, cooperative problem-solving, and valuing the other
in their distinctiveness” (Seigfried 1997: 9).
37 Traditional  Epistemologists  will  respond to  my suggestion  with  a  fear  of  the  strong
contextuality it introduces to theories of knowledge. But, we have learned from Code that
any  efforts  to  limit  or  remove  context  are  doomed  to  eventual  failure.  As  long  as
Epistemologists continue to be willing to recognize we need knowers in order to have
knowledge,  then  knowers  will  bring  with  them  their  contextuality,  including  their
gender. I move on to some pragmatist concerns, as John Dewey recommended philosophy
let go of Epistemology many years ago, and his theory of inquiry serves as an example of
an (e)pistemological theory.
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III. Some Pragmatist Concerns
38 Along with Epistemology’s embracing of an absolutism/relativism dualism that values
transcendental Truth instead of contingent truths, a mind/body dualism that values the
mind at the expense of the body, and a subject/object dualism that separates knowers
from what is known and assigns higher value to the objects of knowledge, we also find
that Epistemology has historically embraced a theory/practice dualism. Epistemologists
are supposed to be concerned with the judging of reasons and reasons (theories, ideas)
are usually described as being in contrast to experiences (practice). Thus we find some
philosophers argue that we cannot trust our experiences and must tune into our ideas
(Idealists),  while  others  describe  our  experiences  as  our  source  of  knowledge
(Empiricists). Overall, ideas have held a higher status in the Euro-western world, as being
more  abstract,  objective,  and  general  than  experience,  which  is  judged  to  be  more
immediate,  subjective,  and concrete.  Both types of  argument still  embrace a theory/
practice dualism, favoring one side or the other. When treated as separate, contrasting
entities then philosophers can ignore their transactional qualities, and again attempt to
avoid issues concerning context, values, and power.
39 Classical American pragmatists, usually represented as Peirce, James, and Dewey (as well
as  Mead  and  Royce),  contribute  significantly  to  the  collapse  of  the  theory/practice
categorical bifurcation. Their contribution is what I want to explore in this section, in
particular Dewey’s contribution. The place to look for classical pragmatism’s contribution
is  in the two key concepts  of  fallibilism and experience. These two concepts  form the
epistemological  and  metaphysical  netting  that  catches  up  the  classic  pragmatists
philosophical ideas. Here I want to focus on Dewey’s contributions to the dispersion of
the theory/practice dualism through his development of the concept experience, which
was significantly  influenced by James’  writings  on ‘experience.’  I  turn to  James’  and
Dewey’s work on dissolving the absolutism/relativism split in Chapter Two of Relational
“(e)pistemologies,” in my discussion on fallibilism.
40 I will argue, as I have elsewhere (Thayer-Bacon, 2000, 2002, 2003), that James and Dewey
were both successful in their dissolution efforts, though each have their own flaws which
get in their way. James clings to the Subject as an individual, which makes him more
vulnerable to relativism charges. Dewey embraces a democratic community of inquirers
model, which is the direction feminists recommend, yet he reaches out to science as a
method for solving doubts, and we found above that feminists have much to say about the
inability  of  science to be objective and impartial.  Classic  pragmatists  do not  address
adequately issues of power, and we already know that feminists have much to say to
insure we understand the connections between power and knowledge. Postmodernists
contribute significantly to our understanding of  the connections between power and
knowledge as well. However, even though Dewey did not focus his discussions on power
issues,  the  way  current  feminists  and  postmodernists  are,  his  discussion  of  the 
philosophical  fallacy  of  neglecting  context  moved  us  to  a  better  understanding  of
philosophy’s own limitations due to its own embeddedness. His discussion on context is
also a way into understanding his concept of experience.
41 In “Context and Thought,” Dewey (1960) looks at language to demonstrate how words and
sentences are saturated with context. He shows how the meaning of words and sentences
are dependent on “the contextual situation in which they appear and are used” (Dewey
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1960: 90). Dewey defines context as including background (which is both temporal and
spatial) and selective interest. Contextual background is what we take for granted, which
is tacitly understood, as we draw our attention to that which we are immediately thinking
of, through our selective interest.
Surrounding,  bathing,  saturating,  the things of which we are explicitly aware is
some inclusive situation which does not enter into the direct material of reflection.
It does not come into question; it is taken for granted with respect to the particular
question  that  is  occupying  the  field  of  thinking.  Since  it  does  not  come  into
question, it is stable, settled. (Dewey 1960: 99)
42 Of course, background context can come into question, in fact that is one of the main
contributions philosophers can make, helping to disturb what we take to be given, and
caus-  ing us  to  bring an aspect  of  our  background context  to  our  selective interest.
“Philosophy is  criticism; criticism of  the influential  beliefs that underlie culture […]”
(Dewey 1960: 107). This task of making the familiar strange is what standpoint theorists
suggest is  the role of  the marginalized,  the outsider who has been oppressed by the
background context. Dewey argues that while we can learn to question our background
context, we can never completely escape our background context, anymore than we can
step outside of our own skins in order to see them from an outsider perspective. We can
only get partial glimpses.
43 Selective interest is the bias or attitude that exists for each of us in every particular
thought we have. This attitude is what determines the questions we choose to ask and the
way we choose to go about answering our questions. This bias is what causes us to notice
certain qualities and not others, and to attend to certain experiences and not others.
“There is care, concern, implicated in every act of thought” (Dewey 1960: 101). Selective
interest is what we have discussed above in the feminist section as the ‘subjective.’ Dewey
explains  how  interest  is  equivalent  to  individuality  or  uniqueness,  when  framed  in
modest  terms,  and  it  is  genius  and  originality  when  framed  in magnified  terms.
“[S]elective interest is a unique manner of entering into interaction with other things. It
is not a part or constituent of subject matter; but as a manner of action it selects subject
matter  and leaves  a  qualitative impress  upon it”  (Dewey 1960:  102).  The opposite  of
subjective is not objective, but rather the merely repetitive.
44 Dewey points out in his essay, “Context and Thought,” several different fallacies “that
tend to haunt philosophizing” (Dewey 1960: 96). These fallacies are examples of ways that
philosophers commit the fallacy of ignoring context, what Dewey sometimes calls “apart
thought.” In philosophical analysis, philosophers commit the analytic fallacy when they
ignore “the context in which and for the sake of which the analysis occurs” (Dewey 1960:
93). The fallacy of unlimited extension or universalization occurs when philosophers try
to move beyond the limiting conditions that set up a contextual situation to a single and
coherent  whole.  “All  statements  about  the  universe  as  a  whole,  reality  as  an
unconditioned unity,  involve the same fallacy” (Dewey 1960:  95).  He then points  out
examples of the harmful effects caused from ignoring context in the accounts given of the
history  of  thought.  Historians  often  write  about  philosophers’  work  without  paying
attention to the conditions of the times in which they originally wrote, thus commiting
the fallacy of ahistoricity. This is again an example of ignoring context. Dewey warns us:
There exists at any period a body of beliefs and of institutions and practices allied
to them. In these beliefs there are implicit  broad interpretations of life and the
world.  These  interpretations  have  consequences,  often  profoundly  important.
(Dewey 1960: 106)
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45 Dewey tells us the significant business of philosophy is the disclosure of the context of
beliefs, and he names experience “the last inclusive context. […] The significance of
‘experience’  for  philosophic  method  is,  after  all,  but  the  acknowledgment  of  the
indispensability of context in thinking when that recognition is carried to its full term”
(Dewey 1960: 108). Dewey reveals his pragmatic leanings, which he called instrumental
leanings,  with his concept of ‘experience’  for Dewey’s logic of experience is one that
argues  meaning is  “primarily  a  property of  behavior”  (Dewey 1925/81a:  141).  Dewey
adopted from Peirce his notion of meaning, that our conceptions are analyzed in terms of
the consequences of our action. According to Peirce, we cannot separate our ideas from
our experiences. “A belief is that upon which a man is prepared to act” (Peirce 1958: 91).
Peirce argues that we determine how clear our concepts are by running them through a
functional test, grounding them to experience. Thus, meaning is defined in terms of its
effects.
46 In Democracy and Education Dewey describes experience as having an active and passive
element,  trying  and  undergoing.  “We  do  something  to  the  thing  and  then  it  does
something to us in return; such is the peculiar combination” (Dewey 1916/66: 139). In
Experience and Nature Dewey describes experience this way: “Experience is not a veil that
shuts man off from nature […] but rather a growing progressive self-disclosure of nature
itself” (Dewey 1925/81a: 5). He goes on to say experience is:
a double-barrelled word […] it includes what men do and suffer, what they strive for,
love, believe and endure, and also how men act and are acted upon, the ways in
which  they  do  and  suffer,  desire  and  enjoy,  see,  believe,  imagine  –  in  short,
processes of  experiencing.  […] It  is  “double-barrelled” in that  it  recognizes in its
primary integrity  no division between act  and material,  subject  and object,  but
contains both in an unanalyzed totality. (Dewey 1925/81a: 18, emphasis in original)
47 Jim Garrison further explains Dewey’s concept of experience. “Experience for Dewey was
simply what happened when human beings actively participated in transactions with other
natural  experiences.  […]  Experience,  for  Dewey,  is  simply  how  the  human  organism
interacts with its environment” (Garrison 1994: 9, emphasis in original).
48 Dewey’s understanding of philosophy’s own limitations due to its own embeddedness
caused him to recommend the need to turn away from Epistemology,  because of  its
assumption of absolutism and neglect of context. He recommended we turn toward a
theory of inquiry, which is best presented in his book Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938,
1955). This book is one that Dewey said later in his life he misnamed, wishing he had just
used the subtitle as the title of the book, for his book is much more about inquiry than it
is  about  logic,  as  traditionally  conceived (Dewey 1960,  “In  Defense  of  the  Theory  of
Inquiry”).  Calling it  a book on logic only led his  readers in the wrong direction and
hindered the book’s reception, he later realized. Today philosophers are rediscovering
Dewey’s Logic and engaging in exciting discussions about it  (Cahn 1977, Sleeper 1986,
Garrison 1995). Given Dewey’s desire to rename his book, I will call it by its subtitle to
help focus our discussion as he intended.
49 In The Theory of Inquiry, Dewey (1955) points out that logic, as a branch of philosophy, is
embedded in a context of philosophical assumptions. He argues that logic is a naturalistic
theory  and  a  social  discipline  (biological  and  cultural  influences),  that  logic  is  a
progressive discipline that involves a circular process. It is inquiry into inquiry. He argues
that “[…] all logical forms (with their characteristic properties) arise within the operation
of inquiry and are concerned with control  of  inquiry so that it  may yield warranted
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assertions” (Dewey 1955:  3-4).  Inquiry is  due to  doubts  –  when doubts  are removed,
inquiry ends. For Dewey, knowledge is defined as “that which satisfactorily terminates
inquiry” (Dewey 1955: 8). He tells us that he has no problem with the term ‘knowledge’ if
we mean by knowledge, the end of inquiry. That is a tautology, a truism. But if we take
knowledge  to  have  a  meaning  of  its  own  apart  from  inquiry,  then  inquiry  becomes
subordinated  to  this  meaning.  This  renders  logic  “subservient  to  metaphysical  and
epistemological preconditions” (Dewey 1955: 8). Dewey rejects a priori principles for logic
that determine the character of inquiry. The conditions for logic are to be determined in
inquiry. In other words, Dewey presents a contextual theory of logic as inquiry. His The
Theory of Inquiry is an account of what takes place in inquiry; he says he was “undertaking
an inquiry into the facts of inquiry” (Dewey 1960: 135). For Dewey, logic is the method of
intelligent behavior.
50 Dewey’s  formal  definition  of  inquiry  is:  “Inquiry  is  the  controlled  or  directed
transformation  of  an  indeterminate  situation  into  one  that  is  so  determinate  in  its
constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation
into a unified whole” (Dewey 1960: 116; emphasis in original).  Inquiry has a common
structure  or  pattern  that  Dewey  discusses  in  many  of  his  books  (see  for  example
Democracy and Education, 1916; Experience and Education, 1938). This structure is similar to
the scientific method. Dewey does not distinguish between common sense and scientific
inquiry, for he says the difference is in the subject matter (difference in the problems),
not in their basic logical  forms and relations.  First we have doubts or questions,  the
institution of  a problem. Knowing begins with a “felt  need.” Something causes us to
inquire,  something disturbs  us,  unsettles  us,  interrupts  “the smooth,  straightforward
course of behavior” (Dewey 1960: 136). The indeterminate situation evokes questions and
attracts our attention. However, no situation is completely indeterminate, some of the
constituents of a situation must be assumed to be settled. This is Dewey’s idea about
background context, we cannot possible question all of our background assumptions in
order for us to proceed, some of which we take to be settled and are likely not even
aware. Then we search out the constituents to help us define the problem. Next we search
for a possible solution, an idea, a suggestion, which we test out to determine if it settles
our doubts. When our doubts are settled, our inquiry of this particular situation ends.
51 For Dewey, “the unsettled, indecisive character of the situation with which inquiry is
compelled to deal affects all of the subject matters that enter into all inquiry” (Dewey
1960: 136).  The subject matters of the problem and the solution are both in question
“since  both  are  equally  implicated  in  doubt  and  inquiry”  (Dewey  1960:  137).  Dewey
perceives  this  as  his  original  contribution in  his  theory  of  inquiry,  his  bringing  the
problem into question and declaring the problem belongs “in the context of the conduct of
inquiry and not in either the traditional ontological or the traditional epistemological
context,” (Dewey 1960: 138). Dewey describes, late in his life, how he used an historical
approach to help elucidate his original contribution. In other words, he tried to give a
larger, historical context to the philosophical ideas he was trying to bring into question.
By taking a larger view, he hoped to make what we take for granted seem strange, and
questionable. He looked at problems “in the context of the use they perform and the
service they render in the context of inquiry” (Dewey 1960: 138, emphasis in original). He
tried “to convert all the ontological, as prior to inquiry, into the logical as occupied wholly
and soley with what takes place in the conduct of  inquiry as an evergoing concern”
(Dewey 1960: 142, emphasis in original).
A Pragmatist and Feminist Relational (E)pistemology
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, II-1 | 2010
15
52 As is typical of Dewey’s (1955) historical style of argumentation, he spent a great deal of
his time in The Theory of Inquiry exploring the history of logic, to demonstrate how logic
historically  neglects  context.  On hindsight,  he  says:  “As  I  look back I  am led to  the
conclusion that  the  attempt  conscientiously  to  do my full  duty  by  these  treatises  is
accountable for a certain cloudiness which obscures clear vision of what the book was
trying to do” (Dewey 1960: 149). A little less time on placing his theory within the context
of others before him, and more time on explaining his in particular (less time on the
problem and more on the solution) might have gone a long way.
53 Dewey dissolves the bifurcation between theory and practice by showing that the subject
matter of theory (the abstract) grows out of and returns to the subject matter of everyday
concrete experiences. He shows that a problem that appears to be unsolvable if its terms
are placed in an ontological context, collapses when treated in the context of inquiry.
54 “When the issue pertaining to and derived from this contrast is placed and treated in the
context of different types of problems demanding different methods of treatment and
different types of subject matter, the problem involved assumes a very different shape
from that which it has when it is taken to concern ontological ‘reality’” (Dewey 1960: 146).
Dewey points out that what has helped science make such great headway in its methods
and conclusions is  its  experimental  conduct,  and the fact  that  even its  best  theories
remain hypothetical in their status (Dewey 1960: 148). A hypothesis used to mean that
which was beyond doubt or question, and now its meaning has radically changed to an
assertion that is subject to verification or proof.
55 Dewey saw science as a good model of his theory of inquiry, but more recently science has
been shown to be just as vulnerable to subjectivity and bias as philosophy (Kuhn 1962,
Gilligan 1982, Keller 1985, Harding 1986). Dewey’s theory of inquiry, which was written
within the context of Darwin’s evolutionary theory and was affected by that context, still
holds, not because it points us to absolute Truths, but because it is useful and purposeful
for answering our questions and solving our problems. It helps us question our specific
interests as well as our background assumptions. It stands up to the test of time as a way
of establishing knowing and meaning, for it starts with experience and it is never beyond
questioning itself. It represents a form of naturalistic (e)pistemology for it still strives to
yield warranted assertions that are not arbitrary, yet it does not rely on a priori principles
to do so. Dewey’s theory of inquiry eliminates the need for an absolutist Epistemology by
assuming justification relies on social practices and human needs, and nothing more.
56 We begin  to  understand how Dewey’s  concept  of  experience  in  relation  to  knowing
opened up a space for feminists to argue for the need to examine the contextual qualities
hidden in absolutist Epistemological theory, from different standpoints of experience.
Feminists’ insistence on the inclusion of women’s experiences, and even more specifically
Black  women’s,  or  Latina  women’s,  or  lesbian  women’s  experiences  in  philosophical
discussions, is an effort to underscore the importance of context. Clearly, Dewey does not
embrace  a  transcendental  view  of  Epistemology.  In  fact,  he  is  very  critical  of
Epistemology due to its a priori principles and its metaphysical assumptions. But this does
not mean that Dewey does not use (e)pistemology, for certainly he gives reasons to justify
his arguments and evidence to warrant his claims. Dewey’s theory of inquiry relies on a
rehabilitated (e)pistemology.
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IV. Conclusion
57 The term relational is ambiguous in that we use it in many ways. Relation signifies the
existential  connections  of  things,  a  dynamic  and  functional  interaction,  and  it  also
signifies  the  logical  relationships  of  terms.  We  speak  of  the  overlapping  and
interconnecting of concepts and meanings that have reference to each other, and we
describe how things affect each other existentially. Relationships can be personal, one-
on-one exchanges as between a teacher and a student, a parent and their child, or two
lovers. We also use the term relational in a general manner, as with social relationships
between a citizen and their country, or the relationship of men to women. We speak of
relations in terms of kinship, that so-and-so is related to someone else, and we say we can
relate to someone else meaning we feel sympathy toward that person. We can compare
our experiences to the other. The plural use of the term, relations is even used to mean
sexual intercourse. Given all the different ways we use this term, relations has a common
theme of ‘connection’ to others which is what I want it to signify.
58 I offer a theory of knowing based on an assumption of connection in many forms. I find it
an advantage, not a disadvantage, that relational means connections in so many ways. My
hope is that its many uses will remind us of the transactional nature of knowing (in the
Deweyian sense of the term).8 I do not mean to emphasize just logical interaction and
existential connection. The connection is not just accidental or incidental, in the sense
that we do not just bounce off of each other like marbles when they hit each other in a
shooting  game.  Dewey  (1938/65)  uses  the  example  of  billard  balls  to  describe  this
bouncing off of each other as an example of interaction, where there is no noticable
change. I want to emphasize that relations are transactional in that we affect each other,
dynamically and functionally, and each is changed as a result. As Martin Buber (1923/58)
describes this transactional quality, relations are mutual.
59 A relational (e)pistemology emphasizes the transactional nature of knowing in a variety
of ways. Most important, it emphasizes the connections knowers have to the known and
helps us understand that we are not spectators to Reality reporting on “it;” we are part of
this world, this universe, affecting “it” as we experience “it.” To describe ourselves as
separate from each other and our world around us is really to miss all the ways we are
connected and related, all the ways we are one with the universe, as a Buddhist might say.
When we understand we are one with the universe, then we can begin to understand how
connected we are, as knowers, not only to each other, but to our products as well, our
knowledge. As Dewey (1938/55) points out, it is really much more helpful to describe
knowledge as knowing, as a verb, for ‘knowing’ helps remind us about the transactional
nature of the relationship between knowers and the known. ‘Knowing’ emphasizes that
this is an active process in which we are all engaged, ‘we’ meaning not just each other but
also  our  wider  world  around us,  in  which  we  reside.  Knowledge  is  made,  by  us,  as
products of this process of knowing.
60 I do not mean to sound mystical, but it is impossible to talk about relationality without
sounding mystical and mysterious. The mystical, mysterious, poetic kinds of qualities that
emerge in discussions on relationality are really more of a reflection of our language and
thoughts than on the concept of a relational (e)pistemology itself. Language is used to
classify and clarify.  Our terms help us separate and straighten out our ideas.  We use
words to differentiate and distinguish, and what I am trying to do here is bring things
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together. I want to emphasize how things overlap, associate, integrate, refer, compare,
connect,  relate  to each other,  and in that relating,  how things affect each other,  and
change each other. Our language tends to strive to create demarcations, either this or
that, and I want to try to soften these marks and show how things are both and, to unify.
What I offer here is not a binary logic, or a triadic logic, but rather a unifying logic, like
James’ (1909, 1977), that presents the universe as whole and open.
61 The  (e)pistemological  theory  I  offer  is  steeped  in  a  feminist  and  postmodern
understanding of the need to address power and its affects on theories of knowledge. It is
also  steeped  in  the  classic  pragmatist  focus  on  addressing  context  (background and
selected interest).
62 Like  my  pragmatic,  feminist,  and  postmodern  colleagues,  I  am  working  to  dissolve
dualisms  traditional  Philosophy  and  Epistemology  embrace,  such  as  theory/practice,
subject/object, mind/body, and relative/absolute. I describe knowers as fallible human
beings who are connected to knowledge, in a knowing relation. I question that a general
account of knowledge, based on a priori standards for justification, is possible.
63 What I present is not a Transcendental Epistemology, for I do not have any Truth to offer.
I do not have the Right Answer. I offer truths, that are assertions warranted by as much
evidence as I can muster, with the understanding that our criteria and standards are
socially constructed and therefore fallible, and corrigible. It is the need to warrant our
assertions  and  justify  our  claims  that  causes  me  to  continue  to  use  the term
‘epistemology’ in its altered form, (e)pistemology. I do not deny the need to justify claims,
I just deny that any justification I can offer has transcendental force. (E)pistemology’s
legitimacy lies in the natural world, which is a contingent, ever-changing world in which
we are active participants. It is important to address questions about what counts as good
evidence, and criteria used to help us make decisions and solve our problems. As we
continue  to  strive  for  solutions,  to  inquire,  problem solve,  and constructively  think,
(e)pistemological questions will continue to arise. Can we avoid these? I think not. I am
not  letting  go  of  (e)pistemological  concerns,  just  the  concept  of  Epistemology  that
assumes absolutism, even in a non-vulgar form. I present knowing as a relational process
between the knower and the known, steeped in strong contextuality.
64 In questioning  philosophy’s  transcendence,  I  walk  down  the  path  that  pragmatists,
feminists, and postmodernists walk. I declare philosophy’s naturalism and philosophers’
fallibilism in a pluralistic universe. I reveal philosophy’s gendered, subjective biases and
its  tendency to  neglect  its  own contextuality.  I  decry the need for  metanarrative  in
philosophy, and insist on the importance of considering philosophers’ powerful role as
legitimators. I walk down this path as a fallible social critic who understands that we can
redescribe what has already been described, we can recreate and envision anew, we can
reform, but we need each other to help us in this process. Not one of us, alone, knows the
Answers. I invite your contributions to the conversation, for as Dewey points out, inquiry
only ends when we have solved all of our problems, and answered all of our questions,
and we are a long way from there. Not only do I think we will never get to that point, I
doubt it is even a desirable point to reach. Disharmony, discontent, and diversity help us
continue to grow and further our knowing.
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NOTES
1. See Chapter One of my (2003) Relational “(e)pistemologies” for the postmodern side of the debate
as I do not have room to present it here.
2. I use the term “Euro-western” to specify what has been traditionally referred to as Western
thought. This is a political decision, due to the fact that without naming Western thought as
European-based thought, other peoples’ cultures are invisibily included in that category. Africa,
and North, Central, and South America are continents in the Western hemisphere of our world,
and yet they have their own cultures and traditions which predate European influence.
3. Feminists coined the phrase “view from nowhere/view from everywhere” to represent the
absolutism/relativism  debate.  Code  credits  Donna  Haraway  with  this  phrasing  (“Situated
Knowledges,” Fall 1988), others credit Bordo, but the terminology can be traced back to the title
of Thomas Nagel’s book A View From Nowhere, 1986.
4. More recently Code (2006)  has described her epistemological  view as an ecological  one in
Ecological Thinking: The Politics of Epistemic Location. 
5. Other  standpoint  theorists  include:  Nancy  Hartsock  1983;  Patricia  Hill  Collins  1990;  and
Dorothy E. Smith 1987, 1990. A discussion of feminist standpoint theory was published in the
Winter 1997 edition of Signs. Hartsock, Collins, Smith, and Harding all respond to an essay by
Susan Hekman (1997). My discussion of Harding's work stems from Chapter 5 of Transforming
Critical Thinking (Thayer-Bacon 2000).
6. This phrase is originally Audre Lorde’s, from a speech she gave titled “The Master’s Tools Will
Never Dismantle the Master’s House” published in (1981, 1983), This Bridge Called my Back, and
(1984), Sister Outsider.
7. Seigfried  embraces  James’  definition  of  truth  as  ‘satisfactory  resolution,’  and  I  am  in
agreement with her, but the mistaken fears this wording triggers for professional philosophers
who equate ‘satisfaction’ with personal feelings and neglect temporal considerations is worthy of
a longer, separate discussion. See Chapter 2 of Relational “(e)pistemologies.”
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8. Dewey  (1938/65)  describes  his  transactional  theory  as  the  “principle  of  interaction”  in
Experience  and  Education.  Interaction  "assigns  equal  rights  to  both  factors  in  experience  –
objective and internal conditions. Any normal experience is an interplay of these two sets of
conditions. Taken together, or in their interaction, they form what we call a situation" (Dewey
(1938/65: 38-9,  emphasis in original).  Later in the same chapter,  Dewey goes on to say:  “The
conceptions  of  situation  and of  interaction  are  inseparable  from each other.  An experience  is
always what it is because of a transaction taking place between an individual and what, at the
time,  constitutes  his  environment …” (Dewey (1938/65:  4,  emphasis  in  original).  Later  in  his
career, he recommended the use of the term "transaction" in Knowing and the Known (1949/60),
written with Arthur Bentley.
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